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New steps to independence 
A new eight-member cabinet of the 
transitional government in East Timor 
was established on 15 July. The new 
body is regarded by both the United 
Nations Transitional Administration 
in East Timor (UNTAET) and the 
National Council of Timorese Resistance 
(CNRT) as a further step towards 
independence. With four East Timorese 
members, it is the first time that East 
Timorese leaders have participated as 
equal partners in the governance of 
their country. 
ntroducing the new body to the World 
Bank meeting to review the East Timor 
consolidated appeal in June (see page 7), 
Xanana Gusmao said that the council will 
be 'the embryo of the future legislative 
body' . 
The cabinet represents an attempt to 
address complaints by East Timorese that 
their participation in the arrangements 
.; 
for transition has been inadequate. 
The new body has already come in for 
criticism, however, with some saying its 
composition should have been determined 
by a more democratic process. The cabinet 
was put together rapidly, behind closed 
doors, and smaller political parties - such 
as the East Timorese labour party, which 
does not belong to CNRT - have 
complained that they were entirely left out 
of the discussions. 
Intense debate about the democratic 
process and the participation of political 
parties was likely to be a feature of the 
CNRT congress scheduled for the end of 
August, where the very future of this 
umbrella body would be at issue. 
Discussions seemed likely to centre on 
whether CNRT should be wound up in 
favour of developing political parties, or 
whether the coalition is still an important 
vehicle for representing East Timor's 
concerns to the international community. 
Tens of thousands of East Timorese remain in camps in West Timar terrorised by militia and fearful 
of returning home (see page 2). 
Timor Loro Sae's 
new cabinet 
Deputy SRSG, Police and emergency 
services: Jean Christian Cady 
Justice: Judge Gita Honwana-Welch 
Political affairs: Peter Galbraith 
Finance: Michael Francino 
Internal administration: Judge Ana 
Pessoa 
Infrastructure: Joao Carrascalao 
Social affairs: Fr Filomeno Jacob, SJ 
Economic affairs: Mari Alkatiri 
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The refugee question 
Bring them home 
Recent reports from refugee camps in 
Kupang, West Timor, suggest that the 
refugee problem has begun to develop 
an air of intractability. Catherine Scott 
reports. 
U p to 120,000 refugees remain in camps in and around Kupang, and along the East-West border. 
However, the United Nation s High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was 
forced to suspend its attempts to register 
the remaining refugees recently because 
its staff were being harassed by pro-
Indonesia ex-militias. 
The problem is complex, and accounts 
differ. According to the UK-based 
Indonesia human rights campaign Tapol 
('East Timorese Refugees still stuck', Bul-
letin No.158, p13) an Indonesian census 
states that 'the vast majority of refugees 
wished to stay in Indonesia' , yet local 
NGOs say 'at least 60 per cent would 
return home under the right circum-
stances' . Ta pol refer to a systematic 
strategy to retain the refugees in West 
Timar, but it is not entirely clear whose 
strategy this is. 
In an interview published by the 
Association de Solidarite avec Timor-
Orientale (ASTO) in Timar Informations 
(No . 88, June 2000), Bishop Basilio do 
Nascimento, who visited the border camps 
in June at the invitation of the Bishop of 
Atambua, notes that 'They [the refugees] 
all want to return, even those who 
belonged to the m ilitias' [my italics] but 
they are worried about how they will be 
received if they try. 
Both analyses acknowledge the 
refugees' fears , but it is unclear which is 
the greater fear: fear of the militias in the 
In the dark years of East Timor's 
history, Timar Link was a constant 
reminder for its readers of the 
ongoing tragedy. I am sure it will 
continue to help in rebuilding the 
nation. Congratulations on your 
50th issue. 
Estevao Cabral 
for FRET/UN 
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camps, or of their neighbours back at 
home. Bishop Nascimento seems to play 
down fea r of the militias, while the Tapol 
report emphasises it and highlights the 
direct involvement of the Indonesian 
military. 
The Tapol report also points out the 
misinformation peddled by the West 
Timorese press, including malicious 
propagandist rumours and even a song by 
former Aitarak commander, Eurico 
Guterres, lamenting East Timor's 'fate'. 
The bishop's account seems to tally 
with the recent visit of militia leader 
Herminia da Silva, who visited UNTAET 
and CNRT officials to negotiate the 
repatriation of large numbers of refugees. 
In return he wanted amnesties, guarantees 
of safety for pro-integrationists, land on 
which to settle and permission for his new 
pro-Indonesian political party to contest 
future elections. 
The authorities decided to call his 
bluff. Border incursions and violent inci-
dents a few days later were interpreted by 
some CNRT cadres as a warning that such 
incidents would continue while the 
amnesty question remained unresolved. 
Pressure points 
What are the pressure points now? The 
Atambua branch of the International 
Office on Migration (!OM) came under 
siege on 11 August from more than 50 
machete-wielding militiamen, with six 
!OM workers trapped for several hours. 
Stung by international criticism, 
Indonesia says it intends to dismantle the 
refugee camps within three to six months, 
and repatriate or relocate the remaining 
occupants. It has appealed to UNTAET to 
provide security and essential provisions 
for the refugees, but blames the security 
troubles on the refugees themselves 
(Agence France Press, 14 August 2000). 
Also, the government's transmigration 
plans, thought to be on hold, could be 
reactivated. As Tapol points out, it means 
that the registration work carried out by 
UNHCR must be completed as soon as 
possible. Spending such long periods in 
refugee camps is detrimental to people's 
ability to resettle elsewhere, and feeds 
dependency. The West Timorese, who 
have mainly been hospitable, would 
doubtless also like to have their space back. 
Peaceful co-existence 
Western commentators, and in some cases 
western donors, tend to link reconciliation 
with repatriation. But it is unrealistic to 
imply that returning refugees may only 
come back if they are willing to make 
peace with those they left behind last 
September. Working out a peaceful co-
existence between pro-integrationist and 
pro-independence factions is part of the 
ongoing challenge that the East Timorese 
face, collectively, in constructing a 
pluralistic, democratic society. It cannot 
be solved by quick fixes . 
Joint practical work towards 
reconstruction - re-building homes, 
hotels, hospitals and schools - by people 
of all political persuasions might help to 
reconcile people more effectively than 
formally staged negotiations and official 
processes . And announcements about 
amnesties at this early stage could well 
inflame raw sentiments and, in practice, 
would be meaningless anyway. 
Reconciliation is achieved in stages, 
and cannot be rushed . Bishop Nasci-
mento's assurances that people need not 
fear retribution are probably reasonable. 
He states in his interview with ASTO, 
'There are quite a few former functionaries 
and administrators, who are in desperately 
short supply and are needed for East 
Timor's reconstruction.' 
Reconciliation and repatriation must 
be de-linked and the refugees brought 
back because they are East Timorese. In 
order to help attract them back, the 
international community must press 
much harder for action to be taken against 
the violent and coercive elements within 
the West Timorese camps. 
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The first issue of Timor Link was published in 
1985. The current issue carries a number of 
50th anniversary messages of support. 
EAST TIMOR: Nation in waiting 
East Timor emerged into the 21st 
century having endured 400 years of 
colonial rule, followed by nearly 
quarter of a century of brutally 
repressive occupation, and finally a 
brief but devastating period of 
violence. Having chosen 
independence, the people of this 
tiny country face the multiple tasks 
that building a political, social and 
commercial infrastructure out of the 
ashes of conflict implies. 
Timor, which lies 482 km north of Darwin, Australia, was settled by Malay, Melanesian and Polynesian 
peoples before the arrival of Dutch and 
Portuguese settlers in the 16th century. 
The eastern part of the island began 
what was to be a long and traumatic 
struggle for independence in 1974, 
when Portugal began a process of 
decolonisation. 
On 11 August 1975 the Timorese 
Democratic Union (UDT) staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesia's threat to 
intervene should the nationalist 
liberation movement, Fretilin, come to 
power after Portugal's withdrawal. The 
ensuing civil war cost the lives of 1,500 
people and saw Fretilin take control of 
most of Portuguese Timor. 
Invasion 
Worried by the proximity of an 
independent state with radical policies, 
in December 1975 Indonesia launched a 
full-scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. After a 
fraudulent 'act of self-determination' (the 
'Balibo Declaration'), in May 1976 East 
Timor was declared to be Indonesia's 
27th Province. The United Nations 
always regarded the annexation 
as illegal. 
There followed years of determined 
resistance by the poorly armed Falintil on 
behalf of the East Timorese. It is 
estimated that some 200,000 people -
a third of the population at the time of 
the invasion - died from malnutrition, 
preventable diseases, or at the hands of 
the occupying forces. 
Under the Indonesian dictator 
Suharto, negotiations between the 
Indonesian government and Portugal -
in international law the administering 
power - became deadlocked. It was not 
until 1997-98, with financial crisis 
sweeping Asia and the final ebbing of 
international support for Suharto's 
corrupt regime, that there were real 
signs of change. 
When Suharto fell, his successor )usuf 
Habibie bowed to international pressure 
and, in essence, traded East Timor for 
much-needed support from the 
International Monetary Fund. Habibie 
offered the East Timorese autonomy 
within Indonesia. If they rejected it, 
Indonesia would 'let East Timor go'. 
The offer was a pragmatic one, made 
by a stand-in president, and 
without wide consultation. Much 
of the Indonesian military was 
appalled. 
In negotiating the terms under which 
a ballot on the autonomy package would 
take place, the United Nations allowed 
Indonesia to provide the security. This 
was to prove costly, as it left the way 
open for those in the military special 
forces, Kopassus, responsible for the 
original invasion, to try to influence the 
result or wreak revenge should they fail. 
East Timor at a glance 
Popular Consultation 
Braving violent intimidation by 
Indonesian militia, more than 90 per 
cent of eligible East Timorese voters 
turned out, and nearly 80 per cent of 
them voted for independence. The 
United Nations had assured voters it 
would stay after the ballot. Although a 
backlash had been predicted, the 
severity of the violence that followed the 
announcement of the results took the 
world by surprise. As UN personnel fled, 
the Indonesian military and militias drove 
nearly 300,000 people over the border 
into West Timor, while killing, raping and 
looting, and laying waste to East Timor's 
long-neglected infrastructure. 
Transition 
Following an intervention by an armed 
international force (INTERFET) in 
September 1999, and with the departure 
of all Indonesian troops on 31 October, 
East Timor came under the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET) headed by Sergio 
de Mello. It was expected to take 
UNTAET two to three years to prepare 
the territory for full independence. The 
first six months of freedom were spent 
responding to a major emergency -
feeding the hungry and trying to 
facilitate the return of the hundreds of 
thousands of displaced. By April 2000 
there were still 100,000 East Timorese in 
refugee camps in West Timor alone. 
Some were displaced further afield. 
Militias were running many of the camps 
and preventing people from returning to 
East Timor. 
UNTAET inherited a country with a 
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economy in ruins. Key challenges include 
the search for reconciliation with justice, 
and supporting the growth of a strong 
civil society in East Timor. But the East 
Timorese are now free at last to begin 
constructing an independent nation. 
In the late 1990s, the political scene 
in East Timor came to be dominated by 
the National Council for East Timorese 
Resistance (CNRT), a grouping of old 
anti-Indonesian parties. The CNRT is led 
by Xanana Gusmao, the 'Asian Mandela', 
who spent most of the 1990s in jail in 
Indonesia for his part in the armed 
resistance. His popularity among the East 
Timorese, and the resilience of the 
people, will be major factors shaping the 
recovery that needs to take place at every 
level of society. 
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Women have their say 
East Timorese women have begun to engage in the range of debates now 
underway on arrangements for independence. 
In June this year, an eight-strong delegation attended the Beijing Plus Five 
review in New York, where the Platform for Action from the Fourth World 
Conference on Women was reviewed. In the same month more than 500 
women attended the first East Timorese Women's Congress in Dili. 
CllR's Milena Pires describes the daunting struggle that women in East 
Timor still face, within their own society and against the United Nations. 
The long and winding road 
As East Timor heads down the path to 
independence, women are still 
struggling to claim their right to 
participate fully in the reconstruction 
of their country. Milena Pires reports. 
'In the interests of economy, Sergio 
[Vieira de Mello, the UN secretary-
general's special representative] has 
decided to do away with the gender unit .' 
According to reports, these words were 
at the beginning of a memorandum 
circulated among heads of the 
Governance and Public Administration 
(GPA) pillar of the United Nations Transi-
tional Administration in East Timar 
(UNTAET) earlier this year. 
UNTAET closed the Gender Affairs 
Bureau until pressure from women's 
groups and some key UNTAET workers 
ensured its revival. Nevertheless, the 
reported incident is a reflection of the low 
priority given to gender rights by the 
transitional authority. 
In another example, the GPA said that 
the proposal to elect one woman and one 
man for each village and sub-district 
development council was unacceptable 
because it went against Timorese culture. 
It seems that policies to mainstream 
gender issues as proposed by 
organisations including the United 
Nations itself - do not easily translate 
into practice. 
As Timar Laro Sae travels the 
challenging road to independence, its 
people are becoming aware that basic 
rights need to be part of the foundation of 
the new nation state. The Indonesian-
inspired phrase KKN (collusion, corrup-
tion and nepotism) is ever-present, 
reflecting East Timor's desire to avoid the 
pitfalls of the past and truly create an 
inclusive and democratic society. 
Nonetheless, there is a danger that 
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some people are paying little more than 
lip-service to this wish . Women in 
particular, who are trying to expand on 
the modest advances made during the 
years of struggle against Indonesian 
occupation, still have to confront the 
prejudices of their fellow Timorese as well 
as UN structures. 
Changing roles 
During the struggle the role of many 
women within the family changed as the 
male bread-winner was imprisoned or 
forced to join Falintil. Women had to take 
on new responsibilities. They also became 
active in each of the armed, clandestine 
and diplomatic fronts of the resistance 
movement. They were armed resistance 
fighters, spies, messengers and diplomats. 
Today, in the words of one young 
Timorese woman, the main preoccupation 
'is not to return to a subjugated role' but to 
continue to evolve, participate and freely 
choose their own destiny. 
The role of the UN in this respect 
should be decisive. But UNTAET is heavily 
dominated by men, and there are no 
women near the top of the administra-
tion. Sergio de Mello; his deputy 
Jean-Christian Cady; the head of the 
humanitarian pillar, Akira Takahashi; the 
head commander, General Jaime de las 
Santos; the chief military liaison officer, 
Brigadier General Rezaqual Haider; the 
chief of civilian police, Carlos Lima; the 
head of the police academy, Luis Carrilho; 
the head of border control and most 
district administrators - all are male. 
Recent discussions about the 
transitional government have not been 
encouraging. Even when 500 women 
came together in Dili for the first 
Women's Congress in June (see page 5) it 
failed to inspire UNTAET to further the 
interests of women. The new government 
structure was not going to include a 
mechanism to ensure gender equity, but 
gender affairs would be added to the remit 
of the social affairs department, and 
would thereafter be merged with human 
rights. Only loud protests and intensive 
lobbying from East Timorese women 
ensured there would be a separate Gender 
Affairs Bureau, and an associated budget. 
Small gains 
In spite of this pessimistic picture, there 
are small gains being chalked up, some as 
a direct result of advocacy from Timorese 
women's groups and international NGOs 
such as CIIR. For example, there will be a 
special unit within the Civpol, civilian 
police, and procedures to deal with sexual 
assault. As a result, a vulnerable groups 
unit has been created, modelled on a 
structure used in the United Kingdom, and 
funding to establish a crisis centre for 
women has been awarded to East Timorese 
Women Against Violence (ETWAVE) 
following a meeting with the UN 
secretary-general when he visited East 
Timar in February. 
New taxes on alcoholic drinks, part of 
IMF-led attempts to raise revenue for the 
budget, have met the concerns of 
women's groups. They feel there is a direct 
link between domestic violence and the 
lack of regulation and easy availability of 
alcohol in markets and on roadsides. 
After Beijing Plus Five - the UN-led 
forum to examine the status of women in 
the world and measure action by 
governments since the Beijing conference 
five years ago - UNTAET's operation in 
East Timar is another reminder that 
achievements have been few and far 
between. 
Timorese women have no illusions 
about what they need to do. Encouraged 
by the success of their first Congress, and 
spurred on by a platform for action they 
are organising, they aim to claim their 
right to participate in the process of 
reconstructing their country. 
Women 
Statement from the first Congress of Women of Timor Loro Sae 
We the delegates of the first Congress of Women of Timor Loro Sae, gathered in Dili on the 17 June 2000; National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRD to develop policies appropriate to the principles enunciated in the Magna Carta of Freedoms and Responsibilities. 
Immediate need 
• determined and committed to the establishment of peace, 
reconciliation, democracy, justice and development in our 
country; 
• acknowledge and honor all the women and men who 
have contributed to the struggle for freedom in Timor 
Loro Sae; 
Adequate resources must be made available by UNTAET and the 
post-transition government for advancing and empowering 
women. 
• conscious of the great challenge and responsibility that 
faces us in the reconstruction of our country and in the 
transition to independence; 
There must be justice for women victims of the violence 
experienced in the last 24 years of Indonesian military 
occupation. Laws and legal mechanisms which protect women 
must be enacted. 
• deeply concerned about the extreme poverty, illiteracy, 
inequality and continued culture of violence present in 
Timor Loro Sae today; 
Literacy programmes for women 
• value the diversity of women and men's experience in our 
society and are committed to establishing a culture of 
human rights, tolerance, freedom of speech and reaffirm 
our commitment to upholding the principles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on 
the Elimination of [All Forms of] Discrimination Against 
Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 
A commitment to implementing policies for gender equity in all 
aspects of socio-economic and political life must be ensured. 
A specific body or mechanism at government level which 
addresses and guarantees gender equity is needed. 
The debate on East Timor's constitution must be inclusive 
and a consultative process with a clear timetable and plan 
which allows for women's input must be established. 
• urge the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) to fulfill the United Nations' commitment 
to gender equity and the international conventions 
referred to in Regulation 1990/Number 1, and the 
Mechanisms must be developed by UNTAET and the CNRT 
to ensure transparency and accountability and an end to 
corruption. 
Dili, 17 June 2000 
The mechanics of transition 
At a conference in East Timor earlier 
this year Peter Galbraith gave an 
insight into the new administrative 
structure, and the nuts and bolts of 
transferring power to the East 
Timorese. The following are extracts 
from his address. 
B efore East Timor can become inde-pendent, it must have a government structure and the people to run it. 
UNTAET's Governance and Public Admin-
istration (GPA) pillar has begun the 
process of recruiting and training a civil 
service. One legacy of Indonesian rule is 
that there are only a small number of East 
Timorese who have the education, skills 
and experience to run an administration. 
Developing capacity is a long term process 
involving education and on-the-job 
training. These tasks cannot be 
accomplished fully in the likely 
transitional period. 
So far UNTAET has established struc-
tures for East Timor and, in consultation 
with the National Consultative Council 
(NCC), has developed public policy. Out 
of necessity UNTAET has functioned as 
the government of East Timor. This 
cannot continue for long. 
UNTAET's mandate is to assist the East 
Timorese to develop East Timor's 
institutions. It is not its job to govern in 
lieu of the East Timorese or to design a 
government based on our conceptions to 
be handed over to the East Timorese on 
independence. 
If the East Timorese are to shape their 
future government administration they 
must do more than staff it - they must 
take political responsibility for it. 
The following is an idea, put forward 
on behalf of Sergio Vieira de Mello, the 
transitional administrator, for how to 
transfer political responsibility. While he 
is not committed to any particular model, 
he is fully committed to the idea that the 
East Timorese must assume political 
responsibility. 
The political transition 
UNTAET will fail if it turns over a superb 
administrative apparatus to a political 
system that degenerates into cronyism 
and authoritarianism. Similarly, 
democracy is less likely to succeed in a 
country without an administrative 
apparatus that can provide basic services 
or implement policy decisions. 
The East Timorese will learn their jobs 
both through formal education and 
on-the-job training. The political leaders 
can also benefit from a period of co-gov-
ernment with UNTAET. Co-government 
can help to establish democratic practice, 
thereby, hopefully, avoiding the problems 
of many newly independent states which 
experience an abrupt transition to inde-
pendence. 
(We probably would not want to use 
the term ['ministers'] to describe the 
UNTAET cabinet members. However, the 
underlying concept is of a shared govern-
ment with cabinet members exercising 
ministerial-type responsibilities). 
In the transitional government, East 
Timorese will hold most of the portfolios. 
Indeed, over the long term UNTAET needs 
to retain only the foreign affairs and 
defence portfolio, and the just ice port-
folio . Before East Timor is independent 
UNTAET cannot abdicate its responsibility 
for defence, law and order, and justice. 
Over time East Timorese will assume 
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control of all areas except those which, 
constitutionally, UNTAET must retain . 
This means that, before the end of the 
transition period, the cabinet could be led 
by an East Timorese politician. Of course, 
the transitional administrator will retain 
his legal authority under the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1272. 
The cabinet and the civil service 
The cabinet will have political 
responsibility for all decisions. As the 
capacity of East Timorese people grows, 
they will replace international 
administrators at all levels. 
On the day that the transitional gov-
ernment is established, GPA department 
heads, who have exercised ministerial-like 
responsibilities, will become senior civil 
servants. Over time, these department 
heads will themselves be replaced by East 
Timorese people . Ministers will be fully 
integrated into East Timorese Administra-
tion] /GPA operations, taking over offices 
in the Governor's House and exercising 
line-management responsibility. 
The East Timorese ministers should 
represent the broadest possible spectrum 
of East Timorese political life, taking into 
account the dominant role of the CNRT. 
Overall, UNTAET will strive to create a 
provisional government of national unity. 
An expanded NCC 
The creation of a new governmental 
structure provides an excellent 
opportunity to expand the role of the 
NCC, as the transitional administrator 
said he would do. Without an election, the 
NCC cannot become a bona fide 
legislature . But it can become more 
representative by including members from 
all of East Timor's districts, as well as 
significant constituencies such as NGOs, 
labour and business. 
The NCC will continue to review and 
approve proposed regulations, UNTAET's 
equivalent of statutes. Both the East 
Timorese and international 'ministers' 
should be accountable to the NCC. Public 
hearings, which the NCC initiated two 
weeks ago with a very successful hearing 
on tax policy, should be expanded and 
taken to the districts . A larger NCC should 
breathe new life into its sectoral commit-
tees. All these steps are intended to 
expand the participation of East Timorese 
in the government of East Timar, and so 
help establish a deep-rooted democracy. 
Constitution, elections and 
independence 
The defining events of the political 
transition will be the adoption of a 
constitution and free elections. Elections 
will be held for a constituent assembly 
which in turn will write, debate and adopt 
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a constitution. Then the constituent 
assembly will become the parliament (or 
legislative assembly) of the new country. 
Independence could follow any time 
after that, although the newly elected 
assembly may wish to continue with the 
transitional government until an East 
Timorese administration is largely in 
place. Of course, once elections are held 
the East Timorese members of any 
continuing transitional government 
should be chosen by the elected assembly. 
East Timor's constitution is an East 
Timorese affair. UNTAET's role is to 
provide expertise and to facilitate the 
broadest possible participation by East 
Timorese people in the constitution-
making exercise. UNTAET's involvement 
in this process will be as little or as great as 
is desired by East Timor's leaders. 
Beginning in June 2000, UNTAET will 
establish a constitutional office under Dr 
Karol Soltan. Dr Soltan will consult with 
CNRT and other East Timorese leaders on 
constitutional issues. 
By October at the latest, UNTAET and 
East Timorese constitutionalists should 
begin a programme of public education 
and hearings to inform East Timorese 
people about the role of a constitution 
and the process of writing it, while getting 
their input. The goal is to ensure the 
broadest possible sense of ownership 
among East Timor's people for the 
country's new democratic system. The 
timetable will depend on the East 
Timorese, but I presume the constitution 
will be drafted towards the end of 2000 or 
in early 2001. 
As the constitution is being prepared, 
UNTAET's Office of Political, Constitu-
tional and Electoral Affairs will begin work 
on a draft election law. The nature of this 
law will, of course, be significantly 
determined by the political system 
embodied in the constitution. 
The preparation of the constitution 
and the electoral law must be kept 
separate from the workings of the transi-
tional government. UNTAET has an oblig-
ation to ensure a level playing field for 
East Timor's first elections. With regard to 
the draft constitution, UNTAET's only sub-
stantive role is to ensure that it adequately 
protects fundamental human rights and 
that the new system is democratic. Of 
course, protection of fundamental human 
rights has been central to the CNRT's view 
of the constitution and is embodied in the 
1998 Magna Carta for East Timor [see 
Timar Link No.44, p6]. 
Date of independence 
Full independence can come at any time 
following elections and after a constitu-
tion has been adopted. Elections could be 
held as early as April 2001 or as late as 
November 2001. In either case, it is 
unlikely that a fully functional East Timo-
rese administration will be in place by 
these dates. Therefore, the newly elected 
East Timorese government may wish to 
reserve the right to continue the period of 
co-government, with elected ministers 
replacing the appointed ones. 
How long should UNTAET stay? As 
long as it is needed and as long as it is 
wanted. As to how long it is wanted, this 
is for the people of East Timor to deter-
mine. The strength of the proposal for 
transitional government is that it provides 
a vehicle which the East Timorese people 
can use to make best use of the resources 
that the world, through UNTAET, has pro-
vided to them. 
• Peter Galbraith, then UNTAET's director of 
Political, Constitutional and Electoral Affairs 
was speaking at 'Reconstructing East Timor', 
29 May - 2 June 2000. 
A family returning home after voting in the August 1999 Popular Consultation. They may get to 
vote for a new government 'as early as April or as late as November 2001' according to Galbraith. 
World Bank meeting in Lisbon 
Reviewing progress 
International and East Timorese NGOs 
lobbied a meeting to review the World 
Bank Consolidated Appeal Process in 
Lisbon on 23 June. Catherine Scott 
reports. 
The meeting, co-hosted by the World Bank and the United Nations Transi-tional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET), was called to review the 
Consolidated Appeal Process launched in 
Tokyo last December, at which 
US$522 million were pledged in humani-
tarian assistance. A further US$16 million 
in funds were pledged at this round, as 
donors expressed support for the Trust 
Fund for East Timor (TFET) . A work 
programme for July to December 2000 was 
also endorsed. 
The review process was designed to be 
self-critical, and the Humanitarian Assis-
tance and Emergency Rehabilitation pillar 
released a three-part assessment for the 
period from September 1999 to May 2000. 
This included a section which draws on 
the perspective of East Timorese people 
themselves, alongside assessments made 
by the humanitarian community and 
appraisals by independent experts. 
The conclusions on the humanitarian 
relief effort were generally positive, but 
there were some criticisms. For example, 
not enough shelter kits were provided, 
care provision for the mentally ill was 
poor, transport was inadequate, and the 
road system deteriorated . Development 
projects are criticised for being too slow to 
get started. Communication between the 
Since 1985, Timar Link has been true 
to its name, providing high quality 
analysis and information on 
developments in East Timor and on 
the Timorese Catholic church in 
particular. With East Timor now on 
the brink of independence, it is time 
to celebrate CllR's courage and 
consistency in giving voice to the 
voiceless. Long may it continue to 
link Timor with the world! 
Dr Peter Carey 
Trinity College, Oxford 
United Nations and international agencies 
and the East Timorese on many aspects of 
the relief operation was also 
disappointing. Many East Timorese 
became frustrated because their expecta-
tions had been falsely raised . 
Most of the criticisms reflect views 
common among East Timorese. And the 
accompanying recommendations for 
better practice were similar to those 
included in the advocacy brief of the East 
Timorese NGOs at the World Bank 
meeting (see page 8 for a summary of East 
Timorese and international NGO concerns 
and recommendations). 
The transition arrangements 
Xanana Gusmao, in his address to this 
meeting, registered disappointment in the 
progress of national reconstruction so far, 
pointing out that it was feeding social 
instability. He urged that administrative 
procedures be simplified and speeded up 
so that reconstruction could take place. He 
also announced that the new structure for 
governing East Timor, the National 
Legislative Council (see front page), 
explaining that it would ensure greater 
participation by East Timorese people, a 
true partnership between the East 
Timorese and UNTAET, and allow more 
time for training and the transfer of 
political responsibility. 
'Our purpose is that after the declara-
tion of independence, the administration 
should be fully East Timorese, in a democ-
ratic, competent and responsible manner,' 
he said. More East Timorese will be intro-
duced into key positions. Thirty-three 
posts have been established, incorporating 
representatives of district and civil society 
groups, such as women, youth, national 
NGOs, social and professional associa-
tions, the private sector, workers, farmers, 
and different religious denominations. 
This council will have the power to 
legislate and enact laws and consult the 
cabinet whenever it is deemed necessary. 
According to Xanana, the council will be 
'the embryo of the future legislative body' . 
He also announced that, in the near 
future, there will be: 
• a law on national and foreign 
investment to regulate the private 
sector and stimulate growth 
• charges on supplying basic services, 
such as water and energy 
• tariffs, taxes and duties on hotels, and 
restaurants 
• an inspectorate general 
• help to carry out pre-shipment mon-
itoring of imported and exported goods. 
CNRT congress 
Gusmao announced that the CNRT would 
be holding its national congress at the end 
of August, to establish national policies for 
economic and political development after 
independence. A commission will be set 
up to design a draft constitution, which 
will be submitted for popular 
consultation, before being considered by 
an elected constituent assembly. The 
congress will also discuss the law on 
political parties and the fi rst general 
elections, and will submit its proposals to 
the National Legislative Council. 
The discussions are likely to range 
more widely than policy issues, however, 
as the continued existence of this 'coali-
tion of convenience' is being questioned 
by many East Timorese politicians. 
Political parties outside the CNRT 
umbrella have felt marginalised in the 
emerging political landscape, as UNTAET 
continues to look to CNRT as its sole inter-
locutor. Some East Timorese are openly 
calling for the CNRT to be disbanded so 
that its constituent political parties can 
come to the fore . Others feel strongly that 
it is not yet time to dissolve the platform, 
and that it has an important function to 
fulfill during the rest of the transition. 
For Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmao, 
the CNRT has been their sole political 
base, having abandoned Fretilin some 
time ago. It is these two leaders, above all, 
to whom governments refer in their 
official and diplomatic dealings, and in 
whom international confidence in East 
Timor's future stability and viability is 
invested. A major question for the coming 
months will be: Where will they find their 
future political home? 
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An agenda for international non-governmental organisations 
lobbying the World Bank Consolidated Appeal Process meeting in 
Lisbon, June 2000. 
1. A clear comprehensive strategy fo r 
t ransition from rehabilitation to 
development which recognises that 
t he priorities of East Timor should 
be developed by UNTAET. There are 
no coordinated mechanisms linking 
humanitarian strategies with 
development. It is noted that 
UNTAET is proposing a committee 
to prioritise development activities. 
The international NGO community 
welcomes a committee that has 
strong East Timorese 
representation, including women, 
youth and national NGOs. It also 
welcomes the planned Common 
Country Assessment, although it is 
crucial that the wider East Timorese 
community participates in 
identifying development priorities. 
2. Donors must diversify their funding 
channels and develop appropriate 
funding mechanisms. The 
independent review of the 
Consolidated Appeal (CAP) found a 
number of weaknesses. Funds are 
disbursed slowly, for example, and 
there is no integrated approach. 
Also, the trust funds are slow and 
cumbersome, and have ignored key 
priorities, such as gender and the 
environment, which did not receive 
funding in the new consolidated 
budget. Donors should make funds 
available for NGO development 
activities to ensure that aid is 
responsive and appropriate. 
3. International NGOs should receive 
short-term funding for providing 
basic services. At the same time 
UNTAET needs to invest in building 
the capacity of the East Timorese to 
provide basic services so that NGOs 
can focus on their traditional 
development role. 
4. UNTAET must communicate 
relevant information in a t imely and 
accessible way to all stakeholders. A 
clear funding strategy for all trust 
funds committed to East Timor must 
be developed and communicated. 
5. UNTAET must develop a coherent 
exit strategy to transfer decision-
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making powers and skills to the East 
Timorese people . UNTAET should 
consult more broadly with the East 
Timorese community, and include 
rural communities, women, youth, 
the church and other civil society 
organisations. 
UNTAET: Priorities for the future 
6 . Gender 
UNTAET has a clear responsibility 
under its mandate to strive for 
gender equity and uphold the 
principles of CEDAW East Timorese 
women have also stated their desire 
for a gender equity unit within 
UNTAET. However, we note that the 
gender affairs unit has not been 
allocated funding in the 
consolidated budget to employ East 
Timorese women . There must be 
adequate resources and training for 
East Timorese women if gender is 
to be treated seriously. 
7. Environment 
Funding has not been allocated for 
the environment in the 
consolidated budget, despite the 
request of the Secretary General for 
an environmental protection unit. 
An adequately resourced 
environmental protection unit is 
essential. 
8. Independent complaints 
mechanism 
Six months after it was established, 
it is essential that UNTAET develop 
an independent complaints 
mechanism to assess its impact on 
the East Timorese community. 
Although there's provision within 
UNTAET for an ombudsperson, as 
yet no one has been appointed to 
the post. There is an urgent need 
for a simple, accessible complaints 
mechanism to deal with individual 
complaints, and for an effective 
system of labour arbitration . 
9. Refugees 
There is still an urgent need for 
refugees to be safely returned from 
West Timor. It will be difficult to 
take meaningful steps towards 
development and reconciliation 
until people have returned to their 
homes. The presence of militia on 
the border is making it a breeding 
ground for regional instability. The 
longer refugees remain in West 
Timor, the more prospects for 
peace in East and West Timor will 
be affected. UNTAET and UNHCR 
must continue to disseminate 
information to refugees in West 
Timor using various channels, 
including NGOs and churches. In 
addition, district returnee 
committees must be trained in the 
principles for reintegrating 
refugees. 
10. justice system 
Without a functioning and effective 
system of justice, the long term 
prospects of reconciliation will be 
severely hampered. UNTAET needs 
to offer ongoing support and 
training to the East Timorese 
judiciary. The first trials must be 
heard as soon as possible in order 
to reassure the East Timorese 
population that justice is being 
done, and to minimise the 
likelihood that communities will 
take justice into their own hands. 
11 . Regulatory framework for business. 
At this point, foreign companies are 
operating in a legal vacuum. 
Debate and discussion is needed on 
an appropriate economic 
framework for East Timor. In the 
interim, mechanisms must be 
developed to ensure that the East 
Timorese are benefiting from 
economic activities and that 
workers have basic protection. A 
regulatory framework for business 
needs to be discussed between 
representatives of UNTAET, business 
and labour. It should include 
guidelines on employment, training 
and joint ventures, and there 
should be a code of conduct for 
foreign businesses. 
12. Disaster response ca pa city 
East Timorese people need 
improved skills in preparing for and 
managing disasters. 
Justice and human rights 
Letter to Kofi Annan 
To His Excellency Kofi Annan 
Secretary General of the United Nations 
Dear Excellency, 
We are writing to urge you to recommend to the UN Security 
Council that it takes immediate steps to establish an 
international tribunal for East Timar, as recommended by the 
International Commission of Inquiry on East Timar. We believe 
this is the only way you can fulfill your responsibility to ensure 
timely justice for East Timorese victims of gross violations of 
human rights and breaches of international humanitarian law. 
We are making this request in the light of the Security 
Council's statement, in its letter to you of 18 February, that the 
perpetrators should be brought to justice 'as soon as possible', 
and following the Council's decision to encourage Indonesia 
'to institute a swift, comprehensive, effective and transparent 
legal process, in conformity with international standards of 
justice and due process of law'. 
We have followed closely Indonesia's efforts to bring those 
responsible to justice through its own judicial system. We have 
also taken into account the views of leading Indonesian human 
rights and legal aid NGOs and lawyers, some of whom have 
signed this letter. Many of them have indicated they have no 
faith in the emerging justice system in their country. Whilst 
acknowledging the efforts and sincerity of some of those 
involved in the process, we have concluded that progress has 
not been satisfactory and that international standards of justice 
will not prevail in Indonesia for some considerable time. 
The December 1999 report of the three special 
rapporteurs of the Commission on Human Rights 
recommended that the Indonesian process should be 
completed in 'a matter of months'. At the beginning of 
February attorney-general Marzuki Darusman said it would 
take three months to decide whether to file charges. That has 
not happened and an international tribunal is, therefore, the 
only viable option. 
Obstacles 
There are three main obstacles preventing the Indonesian 
process from being completed speedily: lack of political will in 
certain quarters to ensure the process succeeds; serious flaws in 
the human rights courts bill now before the Indonesian 
parliament; and the poor calibre of judicial personnel. 
The lack of political will was evident in Indonesia's stance 
at the UN Commission on Human Rights in April. It objected 
strongly to the reference in an initial draft of the Chairman's 
Statement on East Timor to its obligation to set up a 'special 
human rights court that meets international standards'. 
We are now concerned that problems may arise from the 
obstructive tactics of certain factions of the military and police 
legislators, and their allies within parliament and the 
bureaucracy. There have been disturbing signs recently that 
hardline elements of the military are beginning to re-assert 
themselves and back down from their commitment to stay out 
of politics. This could delay the enactment of the human rights 
courts bill by many more months. The military and police and 
Golkar factions in parliament have already raised basic 
objections that could destroy the thrust of the bill. 
The bill will require substantial revision if it is to meet 
international standards. We are concerned that it is not 
consistent with international law in the way it defines 'gross 
violations of human rights'. The definitions it uses fall far short 
of accepted definitions of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. This could lead to crimes being passed off as ordinary 
human rights abuses so that lower-ranking military officers are 
targeted and higher ranking officers and political leaders avoid 
accountability as they have done so often in the past. 
The bill allows for excessive political interference in the 
judicial process. The executive and/or the legislature will be 
involved in appointing the investigators, prosecutors and 
judges, whereas these matters shou ld be the function of a 
neutral judicial body. 
We are extremely concerned by the repeated statements of 
President Wahid that he will pardon leading generals if they 
are found guilty. This intervention is unacceptable. Justice will 
not be done, and not be seen to be done, unless appropriate 
punishments are fairly administered by the courts. 
Independent judges 
We are also acutely conscious of the fact that whatever 
improvements are made to the draft law to bring it up to 
international standards, justice will not be done unless 
professional, independent and impartial legal personnel are 
avai lable to carry out the investigations, prosecutions and trials. 
It is widely acknowledged that very few current judges can be 
regarded as independent or untainted by ingrained judicial 
corruption . Reformist elements in the government are 
committed to overhauling the system, but it is clear that this will 
take time. 
The Minister of Law and Legislation, Yusril lhza Mahendra, 
has admitted there is a shortage of 'capable and clean judges' 
and is currently replacing over half of those based in Jakarta. 
He has set out a five-year plan to revamp the legal system, but 
that time-scale is optimistic given the immense size of the task 
he faces . 
Apart from the judges, there are very few prosecutors and 
investigators who elicit confidence in their ability to act 
professionally and impartially. We are extremely concerned 
about the composition of the team set up to investigate the 
East Timar crimes because it includes military and police 
personnel. The investigation cannot be effective and impartial 
if it involves individuals who represent organs of state that are 
implicated in the crimes. 
It is clear that East Timorese people from every level of 
society want an international tribunal. It is difficult for them to 
trust an Indonesian system that oppressed them for 24 years. 
It is perverse to expect traumatised victims and witnesses to 
testify in an Indonesian court. Moreover, it is wholly unfair to 
use the East Timor trials as test cases for a reformed Indonesian 
judicial system. The crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide committed in East Timar are a matter of 
international concern and should be treated as such legally. 
Speedy justice is essential for peace, reconciliation and 
stability in East Timar - and for democracy and stability in 
Indonesia - and we respectfully ask you to act swiftly on our 
demand for an international tribunal. We are urging our 
respective governments and the European Union to support 
this demand. 
This letter of 5 July 2000 
was signed by 120 organisations 
and individuals. 
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Timor Link's 50th issue 
A voice for the voiceless 
Robert Archer remembers why Timor 
Link was launched and how its early 
issues were received. 
I t seems a long time ago that Timar Link was born. And in the week I heard of Xanana Gusmao's marriage, it is strange 
to consider that beginning. 
CIIR had worked on East Timor from 
its early days. I joined it in 1981 and was 
asked to set up an advocacy programme in 
South East Asia. I remember looking 
through the old files and reading the first 
shocking testimony in London of a 
Catholic priest who had gone with the 
people into the mountains after the 1975 
invasion. I also read Eileen Sudworth's 
vigorous correspondence with aerospace 
manufacturers and the British foreign 
office about sales of Hawk trainer jets to 
Indonesia in 1978 and 1979. 
The early 1980s was one of the darkest 
periods for those who followed what was 
happening in East Timor. There was very 
little information - the first generation of 
resistance leaders had been killed or cap-
tured, and armed resistance was subdued 
and often almost invisible to the outside 
world . Indonesia's political control over 
Timorlink 
Congratulations SOth 
issue 
A quick word of congratulations for 
what you have accomplished with 
the first 50 issues of Timor Link, 
along with hope that the fine work 
will continue. 
What the people of East Timor 
have endured is beyond description. 
Their courage is an inspiration; their 
victory is one of the most 
astonishing on record; and the 
problems they now face are 
daunting. 
Information and serious 
analysis, and the dedicated activism 
and solidarity that should follow 
from it, have never been more 
important. 
Noam Chomsky 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
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institutions was virtually complete and 
large numbers of Indonesians were 
beginning to settle there. At the same 
time, the territory remained almost sealed 
off to visitors from other countries. 
Information seeped out in fragments. 
Political criticism, even on humanitarian 
grounds, could scarcely be verified. The 
famine of the late 1970s was over. Even 
the scale of detentions and human rights 
abuses could not be established with preci-
sion, despite Amnesty International's 
efforts. The only categorical statement 
that could be made abroad was that 
Indonesia's occupation was illegal and the 
Timorese had a legitimate claim to self-
determination. 
Change 
From the mid 1980s this changed, as the 
importance of Xanana Gusmao's 
leadership became apparent, following his 
talks with the Indonesian military in 1983 
and the 1990 visit of the Australian Robert 
Damm to his camp [Domm was to become 
the first foreign minister to meet Xanana 
since 1975]. Gradually, more visitors 
travelled to the territory, feeding the thin 
stream of news. The emergence of an 
urban resistance and nationalism among 
Timor's younger generation transformed 
the political landscape and changed the 
strategy of Xanana and other leaders. 
The local church, under Bishop Belo, 
became a force that could not be ignored 
by the Indonesian authorities, the interna-
tional community or the Vatican itself. 
The massacre of young people in Dili's 
church yard in 1991 was filmed and 
shown on world television. 
But in 1985, when the first Timar Link 
was produced, none of this had happened. 
East Timor was obscure, and most political 
authorities and observers considered it to 
be a fading political issue. What, then, was 
our thinking when, in cottage-industry 
fashion, we assembled the first issue? 
Our first objective related to the near-
disappearance at that time of the resis-
tance movement. In the silence this 
created, the voice of the Catholic church 
became audible. It spoke not for indepen-
dence or political freedom but for basic 
rights and against intimidation and 
oppression. It was a different and legiti-
mate voice - and it was evident that CUR 
could play a valuable role in amplifying it. 
This was our first motive. 
Brown envelopes began to arrive in the 
office, containing brief, often laconic, 
almost always bitter reports of the situa-
tion in East Timor. In the beginning we 
found it difficult to assess the value or 
provenance of these documents - but 
early issues came to rely heavily on them 
and they gave us courage. We felt we were 
on to something, that Timar Link had a 
legitimacy because the voices we were 
trying to hear wanted to speak. 
Currents of opinion 
Having said this, we had little idea then of 
the many different currents of opinion 
within the local church, or the numerous 
pressures to bend its behaviour in one 
direction or another. Our alertness to the 
political complexity of the situation on 
the ground only grew with time, 
particularly following Bishop Belo's 
appointment and the sharp increase in the 
number of Indonesian clergy and religious 
leaders in the territory, with the support of 
the Indonesian church, the Vatican and 
the Indonesian authorities. 
In practice, Timar Link created a space 
for more pluralistic discussion of East 
Timor - one that was not led or domi-
nated by the history and language of the 
liberation movement, but did not ignore 
that voice either. When new currents of 
resistance within East Timor became 
evident, and when the church under 
Bishop Belo became more influential and 
representative of a distinct moral stance, 
Timar Link was well positioned - fortu-
itously - to adjust to the more diverse 
and mobile political environment that 
emerged in East Timor from the mid 
1980s. 
Our second objective was to engage 
the churches in other countries. This was 
also, of course, one of CIIR's responsibili-
ties. In the early 1980s little was being 
done to create awareness of East Timor 
within Catholic or Protestant circles. 
While many Christians deplored the 
immorality of East Timor's occupation, 
few believed it could be reversed and fewer 
still had any link to the territory. 
Over several years, with other organi-
sations and individuals - prominent 
among whom were A Paz e Possivel in Por-
tugal, Adrien-Claude Zoller in Switzerland, 
Victor Scheffers of Netherlands Justice and 
Peace, and Reverend Gordon Shaw of the 
British Council of Churches - CIIR 
helped to create an informal church 
network that did alter the opinion of key 
groups. Timar Link gave CIIR a legitimate 
platform from which to do this work, and 
one of the core objectives in writing it was 
to provide balanced and accurate informa-
tion for people in church organisations in 
Europe, North America and Asia. 
Overcoming isolation 
Asia itself was the third objective. We 
thought that while Asia (and, of course, 
the United States) remained uninterested 
in East Timor, the territory's isolation and 
oppression would not change. From an 
early stage we sent copies to all the 
relevant organisations in Asia that we 
could identify. It is impossible to say 
whether this had a useful effect, and 
certainly the growing conviction among 
Indonesian NGOs that Indonesia's policies 
in East Timor were wrong and should not 
be supported, was a far more important 
influence on attitudes in Asia than any 
information from Europe. 
This is how I remember the start of 
Timar Link - triggered by a hunch, a 
confused intuition that became clearer to 
us as the first issues emerged. We had no 
thought of reaching SO. 
Who were 'we'? I shall miss out names 
that should be mentioned. But at the very 
beginning, the key people I remember 
were Francis McDonagh, then at CIIR and 
now at CAFOD; Stephen Alston, then at 
CIIR and also now at CAFOD; John Taylor, 
whose knowledge of East Timor was essen-
tial to the quality of what we wrote; 
Arnold Kohen in the United States; Pat 
Walsh in Australia; Jill Joliffe, a contrib-
utor to The Guardian, and Jean-Pierre 
Catry of A Paz e Passive! in Lisbon; and 
Anthony Goldstone (and later Sidney 
Jones) who gave advice on human rights 
issues while they worked at Amnesty 
International. 
This, of course, is not to mention the 
unknown Timorese who wrote to us in 
brown envelopes. 
The rest is history. 
TI MOR 
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Issue 22 of Timor Link reported on the 
aftermath of the Dili massacre. 
. ' 
' ' 
Timor link's 50th issue 
Staying power 
Catherine Scott recalls the relaunch 
and revival of Timor Link, which she 
has edited since 1991. 
T imar Link was relaunched in autumn 1991 after a gap of two years. Inter-national diplomacy on East Timor 
had prompted movement for the first time 
in a while. Preparations were being made 
for a Portuguese parliamentary delegation 
to visit the territory and negotiations were 
becoming critical. With the help of Joao 
Boavida, then studying in Oxford Univer-
sity, and Kirsty Sword who recently 
married Xanana Gusmao, issue 22 was 
planned and articles commissioned. 
The pace of events quickened . Jose 
Ramos Horta came on a diplomatic 
mission to London, which I was asked to 
arrange. It was difficult getting people to 
meet him. A journalist on The Independent 
gave him a few minutes, eyes wandering 
back to an article on China on his 
monitor. He did not seem to know much 
about East Timor. Ramos Horta's words 
during that visit were clear and prophetic. 
There would continue to be bloodshed in 
his country unless Indonesia withdrew. 
A month later, the full horror of the 
Santa Cruz massacre was beamed into 
homes across the world, thanks to the 
courage and determination of Max Stahl, 
who played no small part in turning the 
tide of world opinion when he stood and 
filmed the Indonesian army's shooting 
spree in the Dili cemetery. The journalist 
at The Independent must have rued not 
taking more interest in Ramos Horta. 
An institution 
The whole of Timar Link 22 had to be 
scrapped. We were so busy reacting to the 
horror of 12 November 1991 - organising 
vigils, petitions and services of 
remembrance, and launching the British 
Coalition for East Timar - that it was not 
possible to sit down and write, reflect or 
analyse. 
We eventually revised the copy and 
the issue appeared in February 1992. 
Twenty eight copies later, I am still assem-
bling this surprisingly durable newsletter. 
Timar Link has scraped through many 
funding crises. After the Popular Consulta-
tion in 1999, I expected the 'wind-up' 
noises to resume, but found surprisingly 
strong support for Timar Link to continue 
recording and analysing East Timor's tran-
sition to independence. 
One challenge, now that East Timor is 
more accessible, is to encourage more East 
Timorese to contribute directly to that 
analysis . As ever, we will bring news and 
views from the Christian churches, but 
the newsletter has a broad remit. In recent 
years we have sought to give space to East 
Timorese women, and people working at 
the grassroots in East Timor. CIIR now has 
an office in Dili, which will enable us to 
provide even sharper insight into the 
growth of this newly independent nation. 
A healthy dose of 
reality 
Arnold Kohen assesses Timor link's role 
in providing insight into an occupied 
country long hidden from the world's 
gaze . 
As I worked on my recent book on Bishop Belo and East Timor, it became clear to me again that the 
best periodical in English on the church in 
East Tim or over the past 15 years was 
Timar Link. 
As church authorities and secular 
political forces in East Timar today rede-
fine their roles, a glance through early 
, issues of Timar Link is a good reminder of 
the distance that has been travelled. 
In the first four years of the publica-
tion's existence, from 1985 to 1988, East 
Timar remained almost entirely closed to 
the outside world, apart from visits made 
under heavy Indonesian military control. 
Exchanges with the church in East Timor 
were also rare. 
Therefore, the documents and analyses 
printed in Timar Link presented a healthy 
dose of reality for readers who had little 
chance to get anything approaching an 
authentic picture of the terrible dilemmas 
facing East Timor's church and resistance 
movements. More than that, Timar Link is 
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a repository of information, showing how 
the situation has evolved over the years, 
from near total obscurity to Nobel Peace 
Prize and worldwide attention during the 
terrible destruction of 1999. 
In 1985, in its inaugural issue, Timar 
Link was a reminder of a place that much 
of the world seemed to have forgotten. 
Advocacy targets 
1. Refugees in West Timor 
• International pressure is still 
needed on the government of 
Indonesia to rein in elements of 
the TNI (national army) in West 
Timor that are actively training 
and encouraging East Timorese 
militias and allowing them to 
terrorise refugees in the camps. 
• Misinformation by the press in 
West Timor about conditions in 
East Timor should cease. 
• UNHCR should be allowed to 
conduct humanitarian work 
unhindered and without threat 
from TNI or East Timorese militia. 
• Reconciliation between pro- and 
anti-independence East Timorese 
factions should not be a 
condition for the return of 
refugees - repatriation and 
reconciliation must be de-linked. 
2. justice 
• An international tribunal should 
be set up to try the perpetrators 
of last year's violations for crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. 
• There must be a speedy system of justice to enhance reconciliation, 
because it is unlikely that the 
current efforts of the Indonesian 
attorney-general to introduce 
legal and human rights reform 
will be concluded soon. 
• East Timorese people should not 
be expected to testify in an 
Indonesian court. 
• East Timor shou Id not be used as 
test cases for a reformed 
Indonesian judicial system. 
3. United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor 
• Recent attempts to involve East 
Timorese leaders in a newly 
created cabinet are welcome, but 
UNTAET must now make real 
efforts to train East Timorese 
cadres to take up the reins of 
government in the near future. 
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The news always had a special ethical 
perspective, usually (but never solely) in 
relation to the witness of the church. 
The excruciating pressure on Bishop 
Belo in those early years was made mani-
fest, and still makes fascinating reading, as 
does news about the papal visit to East 
Tim or in 1989, and the massacre at the 
• UNTAET's stated commitment to 
gender equity must be backed 
with funding so that a separate 
gender unit can be resourced, 
and the principles of the 
Convention Against all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) upheld. 
• The unresolved status of former 
Falintil soldiers shou ld be dealt 
with as a matter of urgency. 
Individuals must be re-integrated 
into society and given 
appropriate support, according 
to their expressed preference and 
need. 
• An exit strategy should be 
developed by UNTAET. 
4. International community 
• Pledges made by governments to 
the Trust Fund for East Timor 
must be honoured. 
• Adequate financial and political 
support for East Timor must 
continue beyond independence. 
• NGOs should monitor the 
expanded National Consultative 
Council, and the political 
transition processes, and continue 
to press for open, transparent, 
and democratic practices. 
• Adequate training and support 
must be given to East Timer's 
leaders so that they are able to 
take on new roles with 
confidence. 
• Donor governments should 
support gender related 
programmes. 
• Protection of the environment 
should remain a prominent 
consideration in development 
projects, and funding should be 
made available for an 
environmental protection unit. 
5. East Timorese community 
• Voices outside the National 
Council of Timorese Resistance 
should be heard. 
Santa Cruz cemetery in 1991. John 
Taylor's many overviews of the situation 
form an important historical record, while 
Catherine Scott's 1993 interview with 
Bishop Belo remains a key document of 
that time. 
Then, as now, Timar Link had a unique 
role. There is a clear connection between 
the need for action on human rights in 
1985 and the sound, sustainable develop-
ment policies of today, both of them 
rooted in the needs and views of the East 
Timorese themselves. 
Continuing need 
On 22-23 June this year, a meeting of 
international donors was held in Lisbon 
under the auspices of the United Nations 
and the World Bank, with Xanana 
Gusmao leading the Timorese delegation 
(see pages 7-8) . It was amazing that such 
an event should be possible after all the 
dark years . Yet Xanana's presentation -
along with persistent messages from 
Bishop Belo, and many others - under-
lined that East Timor still needs the 
world's solidarity, and will need it for 
some time to come to help it with the task 
of reconstruction. 
At the root of such solidarity is cogent 
information to make possible well-
grounded advocacy. This gives Timar Link 
and others a key function now and in the 
coming years. 
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